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Abstract
This paper provides a new context for an established metaphysical debate regarding
the problem of persistence. I contend that perdurance (the claim that objects persist by
having temporal parts) can be precisely formulated in quantum mechanics due to an
analogy with spatial parts, which I claim correspond to the decomposition of the quantum
state provided by a localization scheme. However, I present a ‘no-go’ result that rules out
the existence of an analogous temporal localization scheme, and so argue that quantum
objects cannot be said to perdure. I conclude by surveying the remaining metaphysical
options.
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1. Introduction This paper provides a new context for an established metaphysical debate
regarding the problem of persistence. Namely, how can it be said that one and the same
physical object persists through time while changing over time? I contend that a popular view
about persistence which maintains that objects persist by perduring – that is, by having
temporal parts – receives a particularly neat formulation in quantum mechanics due to the
existence of a formal analogy between time and space. However, on closer inspection this
analogy fails due to a ‘no-go’ result which demonstrates that quantum systems can’t be said to
have temporal parts in the same way that they have spatial parts. Therefore, if quantum
mechanics describes persisting physical objects, then those objects cannot be said to perdure.
This argument serves two aims. The first is to continue the recent tradition of addressing
the problem of persistence in the context of specific physical theories: Balashov (2010)
considers special relativity; Butterfield (2005, 2006) considers classical mechanics. The
second aim is to provide a novel interpretation of the no-go result mentioned above, which is
well-known in the quantum foundations literature but rarely discussed by philosophers of
physics. The result is often phrased like this: There exists no time observable canonically
conjugate to the Hamiltonian. This fact was first observed by Pauli in 1933, and there are
various proofs which arrive at this conclusion.1 I claim this result is best understood not as an
argument against the existence of time (Halvorson 2010) but rather as an argument that
quantum systems do not have (proper) temporal parts.2
1.1. Argument Outline The argument takes the form of a modus tollens which I give a
sketch of here, leaving technical details for later sections. I begin with a characterization of
perdurance as the thesis that objects persist through time just as they stretch through space.
perdure The part-whole relation for persisting objects applied to time works just like the
part-whole relation with respect to space. That is, persisting objects have proper
temporal parts associated with an arbitrary division of the times over which the object
persists.
I then argue that ordinary quantum mechanics describes persisting objects. This claim
requires (at least) a robust scientific realism about quantum mechanics.
quantum A quantum object (an isolated system described by a ray in Hilbert space
undergoing unitary evolution) is a persisting object.
Taken together, perdure and quantum imply that quantum objects have temporal parts.
Call this view quantum perdurantism. I further claim that if quantum mechanics does describe
1It was recently observed that Pauli’s proof admits a significant class of counterexamples
(Galapon 2002). The result I will give is instead related to the proofs of Srinivas and
Vijayalakshmi (1981); Halvorson (2010).
2This is not to say that there are not other valid interpretations. For example, Unruh and
Wald (1989) provide an argument against the existence of an ideal quantum clock.
persisting objects, then it also provides a legitimate account of the spatial parts of such an
object.
spatial The part-whole relation in space for quantum objects is given by the spectral
decomposition of the Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces, provided by the position
operator Qˆ. This decomposition is unique, and is known as a localization scheme. A
quantum object has spatial parts iff there exists a localization scheme.
Since perdure asserts that the relation of parthood applied to time is just like the relation
of spatial parthood, it follows that a quantum perdurantist is committed the existence of a
temporal localization scheme which operates in an analogous way to spatial. That is,
perdure, quantum and spatial jointly entail the following conditional statement.
temporal If quantum perdurantism is true then every persisting quantum object has a unique
decomposition into temporal parts provided by a temporal localization scheme.
Unfortunately for the perdurantist, the consequent is demonstrably false: The spectral
condition states that the Hamiltonian of every system has a spectrum bounded from below –
roughly, every system has a state of lowest energy – and entails that no quantum objects
possess a temporal localization scheme. Therefore quantum perdurantism is false; quantum
objects have no (proper) temporal parts.
This leaves two possibilities: Either they have no temporal parts (endurantism), or one
temporal part (temporal holism). I argue that, although there is little to choose between these
rival views in the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, considerations from
relativity favor temporal holism.
2. The Metaphysics of Persisting Objects How does a material object persist through time
while changing with time? There are essentially two schools of thought: Either a persisting
object has no temporal parts, is self-identical at every moment it exists, and its spatial
properties change with time (endurantism), or a persisting object necessarily has temporal
parts which have differing spatial properties (perdurantism). Another common way of
phrasing the distinction is as a conflict between three-dimensionalism and
four-dimensionalism: If an object endures then it exists in three dimensions (since it has no
temporal width); if it perdures then, having temporal width, it exists in four dimensions.3
I will follow Lewis (1986) in using the term perdurance for the latter possibility, which I
take to be a thesis about the existence of temporal parts.
Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages,
though no one part of it is wholly present at more that one time; whereas it
endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. Perdurance
corresponds to the way a road persists through space; part of it is here and part of
it is there, and no part is wholly present at two different places. (Lewis 1986, 202)
So for perdurantism to be true, it must be the case that persisting objects be amenable to
decomposition into (proper) temporal parts. It has been complained that the notion of being
wholly present is problematic (e.g. (Sider 1997; McCall and Lowe 2003)) but I will argue that,
within quantum mechanics, it can be given a precise meaning due to a formal analogy with
being wholly located.
3Among four-dimensionalists, there is a further dispute about reference: When we speak
of an object e.g. “the table” do we refer to a particular instantaneous stage, i.e. the table at
time t, (Sider 1997; Hawley 2004) or the entire temporally extended object?
I take the motivation for perdurantism to be a strong analogy between time and space.
Sider expresses this idea as follows:
As I see it, the heart of four-dimensionalism [perdurantism] is the claim that the
part-whole relation behaves with respect to time analogously to how it behaves
with respect to space ... Applied to time, the idea is that for any way of dividing
up the lifetime of an object into separate intervals of time, there is a
corresponding way of dividing the object into temporal parts that are confined to
those intervals of time. (Sider 1997, 204)
I will argue that the appropriate part-whole relation for spatial parts in quantum mechanics
is provided by a localization scheme (in Section 4), which commits the perdurantist to a thesis
about temporal localizability in quantum mechanics (in Section 5).
3. Persisting Objects in Quantum Mechanics Quantum mechanics provides our best
theory of matter, and its empirical predictions have been startlingly accurate. That much is
uncontroversial. On the other hand, any attempt to assert exactly why it has proved so
successful, or precisely what it tells us about the nature of material objects involves taking
sides on disputes regarding its interpretation that have lasted over 80 years and show little sign
of abating. Therefore, I will proceed by specifying under what conditions one would be
committed to regarding the quantum state as describing a persisting material object.
Nonetheless, I take it that prima facie a realist metaphysician who takes chairs (composed of
complex collections of organic molecules) to be persisting objects would be compelled to
similarly regard, say, a molecule of Buckminsterfullerene (C60) composed of sixty atoms of
carbon, and recently shown to display distinctly quantum behavior (Nairz et al. 2003).
First, some details about the formalism of ordinary (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics.
As our concern is with spatio-temporal properties, we will consider systems with no internal
degrees of freedom (i.e. spinless particles). Therefore, the state space of the theory is
provided by the space of square integrable functions defined over all of space, that is,
infinite-dimensional (separable) complex Hilbert spaceH = L2(R) (for simplicity we will
consider only one spatial dimension). The pure states |ψ〉 are in one-to-one correspondence
with the one-dimensional subspaces ofH or, equivalently, the set of normalized vectors that
individually span those subspaces. SinceH is a vector space, linear combinations of pure
states are also pure states (this is known as the superposition principle). In what follows I will
only consider pure states.
The first interpretative posit I require is realism, the claim that real physical systems are
authentically described by quantum mechanical states. The next posit I require is
completeness, the claim that a pure state provides a complete description of an individual
quantum system which leaves nothing out (i.e. no hidden variables). So far we would be
justified in claiming that the quantum state describes a physical object. But what about
persisting objects?
We require some facts about quantum dynamics. In the Schro¨dinger picture, the history of
a system is given by a series of (pure) states |ψ(t)〉, where t ∈ R. Once the state |ψ(0)〉 at a
time t = 0 is given, the entire history is determined according to the time-dependent
Schro¨dinger equation in terms of a one-parameter (strongly continuous) group of unitary
operators U(t) = e−iHt, where H is the Hamiltonian of the system. If a pure state |ψ(0)〉
describes a physical object which exists at time t = 0, then a history |ψ(t)〉 describes a
persisting object which exists at each t and changes with time. The infamous measurement
problem arises when we consider the relation of the unitary dynamics of the state to the
results of laboratory observations.
The observables of the system are self-adjoint operators4 onH associated with
measurable quantities, and the values they may take on measurement correspond to the
spectrum of the operator. For an observable Aˆ with a discrete spectrum (e.g. the Hamiltonian
of a simple harmonic oscillator), each spectral value an has an associated eigenvalue equation
Aˆ|φn〉 = an|φn〉, where |φn〉 is an eigenstate of Aˆ. Distinct eigenvalues are associated with
mutually orthogonal subspaces (eigenspaces) |an〉 which are spanned by the vectors |φn〉 with
zero inner product, 〈φm|φn〉 = 0 for m 6= n. Any vector can be written as a weighted sum
|ψ〉 = ∑n |an〉〈an|ψ〉 = ∑n cn|ψn〉, where |ψn〉 is the projection of |ψ〉 onto |an〉 and cn are
complex coefficients
∑
n |cn|2 = 1. This is known as the spectral decomposition or resolution
of the identity ofH with respect to Aˆ, which we can write as Aˆ = ∑n an|an〉〈an|.
According to the standard story, the probability of obtaining a particular value an in
measurement is given by 〈ψ|ψn〉 = |cn|2 (the Born Rule) and, having observed a system to
take a particular value, upon repeating the measurement of the observable it will be found to
have the same value an. However, according to the formalism the only way this could happen
is if the system were in an eigenstate of Aˆ (known as the eigenstate-eigenvalue link), but since
(i) in general a system is not in an eigenstate with respect to Aˆ, and (ii) the dynamics provided
by the Schro¨dinger equation are unitary, there is (in general) no reason to think that a system
should ever be found in such a state. This is the measurement problem.
The third posit I will require is, therefore, that we consider isolated quantum systems
which need only unitary evolution for their complete description over time; persisting
quantum objects are isolated systems on this view. This means that we will not need to
4An operator Aˆ is symmetric onH iff 〈ψ|Aˆφ〉 = 〈Aˆψ|φ〉 for all elements in its domain
D(Aˆ) ⊆ H. It is self-adjoint Aˆ = Aˆ† iff it is symmetric and D(Aˆ) = D(Aˆ†).
concern ourselves with the measurement problem. This invites the worry that very few
systems in the actual world will fall under this criterion. Maybe so, but on at least one
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Everett-style realist ‘no-collapse’) all systems undergo
only unitary evolution.
4. Parts and Spatial Parts What is a part of a quantum object? I contend that a suitable
part-whole relation is provided by considering the subspaces ofH, or equivalently the
projections onto those subspaces. According to classical mereology, the relation of parthood
is (minimally) reflexive (everything is part of itself), transitive (if p is part of q and q is part of
r then p is part of r) and antisymmetric (no two distinct things can be part of each other). As
is well known, the subspaces of a vector space A,B,C... are partially ordered by the relation
of inclusion, which is reflexive (A ⊆ A), transitive (if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ C then A ⊆ C) and
antisymmetric (if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A then A = B).
I claim that in quantum mechanics the spatial parts are given in terms of the subspaces of
theH associated with the spectral decomposition of the position observable Qˆ. As Qˆ has a
(purely) continuous spectrum, this will require some more details about self-adjoint operators.
Since the pioneering work of von Neumann we have known that any self-adjoint operator
(even an unbounded continuous operator) onH is uniquely associated (up to unitarity) with a
spectral measure which allows us to replace the sum over projections onto eigenspaces with
an integral Qˆ =
∫
R λ dEλ, where Eλ is a spectral family of projections with λ ∈ R. It is this
which allows us to write the position operator as an integral over space Qˆ =
∫
dx x |x〉〈x|.5
5However, note that the equation Qˆ|q〉 = q|q〉 is a merely formal expression in this case i.e.
|q〉 is a (so-called) improper eigenstate and not an element ofH.
We may associate with each Borel set6 ∆ ∈ B(R) a projection P Qˆ(∆) = ∫
∆
λdEλ. The
map P Qˆ : ∆ 7→ P Qˆ(∆) is known as a Projection Valued Measure (PVM) and has the







σ-additivity), where ∆n is a sequence of mutually disjoint Borel sets ∆m ∩∆n = ∅ for
m 6= n. We can do this quite generally since the self-adjoint operators onH are in one-to-one
correspondence with the set of PVM’s (Teschl 2009, Thm. 3.7).
What does this have to do with spatial parts? Well, the Borel sets correspond to spatial
regions in a very intuitive way since any two sets of spatial points which occupy the same
volume of space are assigned the same Borel set (of R3 now); a Borel set is an equivalence
class of sets of points under the relation having the same volume. Take an ordinary object that
occupies exactly a cube. Pick four opposite vertexes of the cube which lie in a plane (such
that not all four are on the same face). How many ways are there of dividing the cube into two
parts of equal volume along that plane? Presumably we would want to say: “There is only one
way, straight down the middle!” And this is just the answer we find from looking at the Borel
sets.
However, if we consider instead the set of points that lie in the interior of the cube there
are three ways: one that excludes the points that lie on the plane, one that gives them to the
left hand part, and one that gives them to the right hand part.7 The upshot of these sort of
6B(R) is the smallest σ-algebra over R containing all open intervals of R. A σ-algebra
over a set is a (nonempty) collection of subsets closed under complementation and countable
union.
7Also note that to allow spatial parts corresponding to non-measurable sets would open the
door to paradoxical results regarding their re-composition, illustrated by the Banach-Tarski
theorem. For a discussion of these issues see Arntzenius (2008).
considerations, I take it, is that we would rather associate spatial parts with Borel sets rather
than sets of points (or, equivalently, only with sets of points dense in some open interval of R).
So, if you accept the notion of parthood I articulated above, then the PVM P Qˆ associated
with the position observable Qˆ provides a neat assignment of spatial regions to parts of the
state space. It has the attractive property that any spatial region is associated with a unique
projection, and, furthermore, if two regions are disjoint ∆1 ∩∆2 = ∅ then they are associated
with mutually orthogonal projections P Qˆ(∆1)P Qˆ(∆2) = P Qˆ(∆2)P Qˆ(∆1) = 0, while if they





Qˆ(∆1 ∩∆2) (from property (ii)).
This is a localization scheme in the sense that performing a measurement that corresponds
to a projection P Qˆ(∆) has the possible outcomes {0, 1}: either the system is located in ∆ or
the system is not located in ∆. Furthermore, these possibilities are mutually exclusive in that
P Qˆ(R/∆) = I − P Qˆ(∆) (from (ii)). Therefore, the system may be said to be ‘wholly located
in ∆ at t’ on the condition that P Qˆ(∆)|ψ(t)〉 = |ψ(t)〉. Since in general the system will not be
in an eigenstate of any projection P Qˆ(∆) we say not that it is located somewhere but rather
that it is localizable. If a pure state |ψ〉 describes a quantum object then, I claim, the
projections P Qˆ(∆)|ψ〉 denote the spatial parts of the object.
Another characteristic of the PVM P Qˆ which justifies the contention that it provides an
assignment of parts is that it covaries with spatial translations
U(a)−1P Qˆ(∆)U(a) = P Qˆ(∆ + a), where U(a) = e−iPˆ a is the one-parameter unitary group
of spatial translations generated by the total momentum Pˆ . Roughly, this is a consequence of
the fact that Qˆ and Pˆ are canonically conjugate [Qˆ, Pˆ ] = i~. Viewing these transformations
passively as a relabeling of the spatial axis, covariance assures us that we are picking out the
same parts despite having changed their relation to the labels.
Now, there is something a little disconcerting about these spatial parts. Firstly, (in general)
each quantum object appears to be composed of parts that together cover all of space (from
(i)). Secondly, these spatial parts do not ‘move with the object’ since
U(t)−1P Qˆ(∆)U(t) = P Qˆ(∆). Neither of these features represent genuine problems for this
view. First, there is nothing metaphysically necessary about the view that physical objects
have limited spatial extent. Fields, for example, qualify as genuine physical entities without
being limited to a particular region of space. Moreover, although the localization scheme
necessarily covers all of space, the object itself may be localized in the above sense. Second,
this might be thought of as a boon for the perdurantist since it restores a symmetry between
time and space by removing the need to define spatial parts relative to spatial location (see
Butterfield (1985)).
Another potentially disconcerting feature of these quantum spatial parts is that they are
defined in terms of the position observable for the entire system with state |ψ〉, and so it may
be the case that even though we (naively) suppose the system to be further decomposed into
distinct subsystems |ψ〉 = |η〉 ⊗ |ξ〉, the spatial parts assigned in this way fail to respect this
decomposition such that the spatial degrees of freedom of the subsystems fail to be
independent. This is known as entanglement, and is a pervasive feature of quantum
mechanics. If the subsystems are considered to be spatially separated then entanglement may
result in non-locality, in the sense that the results of local measurements of position on one
subsystem may depend on the results of local (but distant) measurements on the other
subsystem. The view taken here is that this apparent tension results from an incorrect notion
of mereology: subsystems do not correspond to independent spatial parts unless they are
associated with mutually orthogonal projections P Qˆ(∆).
5. (No) Temporal Parts What is a temporal part of a quantum object? A possible response
might go as follows: Since the instantaneous quantum state determines all the kinematical
properties of the system, we can specify the temporal parts of a quantum object by a simple
assignment of the states |ψ(t)〉 to times t ∈ R . This ‘naive’ scheme would assign to arbitrary
sets of times {T} the temporal part |ψ(t)〉 only if t ∈ {T}. However, the scheme completely
fails to provide a partition of the object into parts. The problem is that the parameter t indexes
a family of temporal translations, so fails to respect the requirement that temporal parts be
‘wholly present’ at t.
By means of analogy, consider the family of states |ψ(a)〉 = U(a)|ψ(0)〉 where U(a) is
again the group of spatial translations by a. The naive spatial location scheme would assign
parts (subspaces ofH) to spatial points {X} according to whether or not value of the index a
lies in {X}. But the claim that |ψ(a)〉 is ‘wholly located’ at the position a doesn’t make sense
since a merely denotes the spatial interval by which the state |ψ(0)〉 was translated. In general
|ψ(0)〉 will not be located anywhere in particular (unless an eigenstate of some P Qˆ(∆)) and
so |ψ(a)〉 picks out the same ‘part’ as |ψ(0)〉.
Exactly the same analysis applies to the temporal translations U(t). So to identify distinct
temporal parts the perdurantist needs a temporal localization scheme which assigns to
temporal intervals (proper) subspaces of the state space of the system, and so parts of |ψ〉: that
is, a Projection Valued Measure P Tˆ (∆) associated with a self-adjoint operator Tˆ . In order that
this scheme picks out genuine temporal parts, we should expect this scheme to covary with
time translations U(t)−1P Tˆ (∆)U(t) = P Tˆ (∆ + t) so that under a relabeling of the time axis
the labels change but not the parts.
Unfortunately for the would-be quantum perdurantist, it turns out that these requirements
are in conflict with the restriction on physical Hamiltonians known as the spectral condition,
which permits only Hamiltonian operators with a spectrum bounded from below i.e. only
systems with a state of lowest energy. The usual argument for this is that to do otherwise
would allow for systems which may transfer energy to their surroundings indefinitely. While
it is true that all systems we know obey the spectral condition (e.g. a free particle or harmonic
oscillator), we could also view it as a principle of the theory on par with the second law of
thermodynamics.
Now, it is a theorem that if a self-adjoint Hamiltonian onH obeys the spectral condition
then there can be no time PVM that covaries with time translations (see Srinivas and
Vijayalakshmi (1981, Thm. 1) or Halvorson (2010)). Roughly, the spectral condition implies
that any two vectors inH related by a time translation are non-orthogonal, so that the only
assignment of temporal intervals to mutually orthogonal subspaces is P Tˆ (∆) = 0 for all ∆.8
Thus no quantum object has (proper) temporal parts.
It is worth emphasizing that the problem is not that we cannot find a covariant assignment
of temporal intervals to operators, but rather that there is no such assignment to projections on
H. So while it is the case that we can find a covariant mapping of intervals to operators in the
form a Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM), these assignments come without an
associated spectral decomposition ofH and, moreover, are non-unique (Hegerfeldt and Muga
2010). This failure to find a temporal decomposition of the state space into distinct subspaces
means that a quantum object cannot have temporal parts in the same way as it has spatial parts.
However, such POVM’s do provide a generalized resolution of the identity parameterized
by t so giving meaning to the notion of a temporal interval in terms of operators onH (Holevo
1982). Therefore I see no reason to deny that time should be afforded the status of a physical
parameter – although not one associated uniquely with a self-adjoint operator – and in this
8This implies there is no self-adjoint operator Tˆ canonically conjugate to the Hamiltonian.
sense I disagree with Halvorson’s claim that “time [in quantum theory] is not a quantity at all
– not even an unobservable quantity” (Halvorson 2010, 1).
6. Conclusion For the perdurantist, the failure to find a temporal localization scheme has a
worrying implication for the claim that persisting quantum objects have temporal parts: If an
object has temporal parts then times should be associated uniquely with subspaces ofH just
as spatial regions are uniquely associated with spatial parts through a localization scheme
P Qˆ(∆). The claim that the part-whole relation applied to space is the same as the part-whole
relation applied to time is demonstrably false when applied to quantum objects. To the extent
that we have reason to think that all persisting objects are quantum objects, this provides
reason to doubt that perdurantism is true.9
In fact, the result we have demonstrates that only two temporal partitions are consistent
with the requirements: Either there are no temporal parts, or there is one part corresponding to
the entire history |ψ(t)〉. While I have argued that both these options are problematic for the
perdurantist, the former is consistent with endurantism since the endurantist maintains that
persisting objects have no temporal parts and no temporal width; the endurantist claims there
is exactly one persisting object existing at each moment, and so may consistently attribute to
that object at time t the state |ψ(t)〉.
9Arguably, classical persisting objects are best thought of as “patterns that emerge from an
ubiquitous, continuous, and very efficient process of decoherence.” Butterfield (2006, 41).
Decoherence refers to the process by which interactions between an ‘object’ system (e.g. a
dust particle) and its environment serve to pick out a dynamically ‘preferred’ basis according
to which the object system is approximately diagonalized. My argument concerns the basis
independent description of the entire system of object and environment.
However, the latter option admits a valid four-dimensional interpretation which I call
temporal holism, corresponding to the idea that the quantum state has exactly one temporal
part comprising its entire history.10 This offers an interesting resolution of the problem of
persistence since it effectively denies that persisting objects change with time. It is distinct
from endurantism in that although the same object is present at each time it is never wholly
present; and distinct from perdurantism in the sense that although the persisting object exists
at many times, no part of it is ever wholly present either.
A similar view has been advocated by Rovelli (2004) on the basis of relativistic
considerations that he traces back to Dirac’s preference for the Heisenberg formulation of
quantum mechanics (in which the observables not the state are regarded as varying in time)
over the Schro¨dinger picture (adopted above, in which the state varies not the observables).
Since the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures are strictly equivalent within non-relativistic
quantum mechanics the situation there is effectively neutral with respect to temporal holism
and endurantism. Nonetheless, temporal holism may be thought to win out to the extent that
four-dimensionalism is encouraged by relativity, having ruled out perdurantism by the above
argument.
10This is similar to the ‘worm view’ advocated by Balashov (2010) in the context of special
relativity but there are obvious difficulties with describing quantum systems in terms of
world-tubes.
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